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In his seminal paper on “failure mode assumptions and assumption coverage” [1], David
Powell defines several central concepts:
1. The notion of failure mode assertions, i.e., precise statements about the way in which
certain components may fail in the time domain and the value domain.
2. The failure mode implication graph, i.e., a lattice induced by the combination of failure
modes defining the partial order between different composed failure modes.
3. The notion of assumption coverage, i.e., the probability that the assertion defining the
assumed behavior of a component proves to be true in practice conditioned by the fact
that the component has failed [1, p. 391].
The goal of this discussion session was to reflect on the similarities and differences between
safety and security regarding attacker assumptions and assumption coverage and to ask
whether any related work and concepts exist. Safety was understood here as the area of fault-
tolerance and dependability, whereas security was understood as the area of cryptography.
The connection to the title of this Dagstuhl seminar was the fact, that one of the biggest
failures in security appears to be the fact that we do not learn sufficiently from other areas.
Regarding the concept of attacker assumptions, our observation was that in safety attacker
assumptions are usually fixed for a specific scenario and in this scenario often empirically
measurable. Examples are failure rates of components or maximum frequency of bitflips on
communication lines or in memory. The mechanism, with which a component attempts to
tolerate these problems, has no influence on the assumption coverage.
In security, the attacker assumption is usually determined by a domain expert and
must be regularly checked whether it is still correct. It can even change spontaneously. In
circumstances where this is expected to happen, issues of risk management arise. Furthermore,
security mechanisms can have an effect on attacker behavior:
either a strong mechanism deters attackers and makes the system uninteresting compared
to others,
or a weak mechanism is circumvented easily with minimal effort.
In safety we have concepts like graceful degradation and stabilization. On the one hand,
graceful degradation means that the level of violation of specification is proportional to the
strength of failure behavior. On the other hand, stabilization refers to a temporary violation
of a safety property if attacker assumption is violated, and a return to safety property when
attacker assumption is satisfied.
In security, the attacker assumption is usually a worst-case attacker assumption. Interme-
diate levels of attackers are unusual. Also switching between different security mechanisms
is unusual and it is unclear on what basis the switch should occur since many violations of
confidentiality and integrity are undetectable.
In the discussion, people from security admitted that worst-case assumptions usually are
prefered, but often also weaker assumptions are used, so the cryptography community does
not really live up to this claim of always choosing worst-case assumptions.
It was also mentioned that testing has strong similarities to transient attacks that try to
throw a single machine off the tracks, and that stabilization has similarities to the mechanisms
used to tolerate denial-of-service attacks.
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Values in Computing (ViC) is about understanding how human values influence software
production and transforming the way values are considered in software industry practices,
policy making and education. With the increasing number of high impact technology breaches
and failures, we need computing professionals equipped to understand what human values are
and what social responsibility means. To this end, we need to help create more resilient, secure
and less vulnerable software systems that are mindful of the wider ethical, social and human
impact of what their technology does or could do. ViC has a body of research establishing a
framework for the systematic investigation of human values in software production and a
website to disseminate our work (www.valuesincomputing.org ).
How can software (security) incident story-telling be used to improve SE industry and
education practices?
4.5 DRM and Security – A Big Failure?
Stefan Katzenbeisser (Universität Passau, DE)
License Creative Commons BY 3.0 Unported license
© Stefan Katzenbeisser
In the talk we discuss the evolution of Digital Rights Managenent techniques, which were
proposed to secure online content. The key idea was to encrypt content and transmit the
encryption key in a special license. The failure of DRM can be tracked down to technical
issues (such as the absence of trusted hardware at that time), changes in the business model
(such as the uprising of flatrate streaming media) and usability problems. Media security
tried to fill this gap by marking distributed media invisibly. Still, the fundamental different
nature of analog signals led to numerous problems (such as robustness issues and conflicts
in dispute resolution). Nevertheless, the techniques developed in the area of media security
nowadays play a significant role in the construction of covert channels.
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